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Abstract
It is shown that under reasonable assumptions a Drake-style equation can be
obtained for the probability that our universe is the result of a deliberate simulation.
Evaluating loose bounds for certain terms in the equation shows that the probability
is unlikely to be as high as previously reported in the literature, especially in a sce-
nario where the simulations are recursive. Furthermore, we investigate the possibility
of eavesdropping from the outside of such a simulation and introduce a general attack
that can circumvent attempts at quantum cryptography inside the simulation, even if
the quantum properties of the simulation are genuine.
1 Introduction
The question of whether or not we are living inside a computer simulation has inspired a
large amount of fiction (notably the novel Simulacron-3 [1] and the movie The Matrix [2]),
but, unsurprisingly, not much serious research. Among the more reasonable and quantitative
attempts, let us mention Nick Bostrom’s simulation argument [3]: if societies do not tend
to self-destruct before acquiring the technology necessary to the exploitation of a significant
fraction of the computing power inherently permitted by the laws of physics, our probability
of living inside a simulation approaches unity. This fairly pessimistic point of view has been
widely publicized, for instance making it into The Guardian [4] where, among others, Elon
Musk is reported to have ascertained that we almost certainly live within a simulation, going
as far as saying “The odds we’re in base reality is one in billions” at the Code Conference
2016 [5].
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
09
27
5v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.p
op
-p
h]
  2
1 A
ug
 20
20
As with many things in theoretical computer science, the idea that our world may be
a simulation needs revisiting in light of the development of quantum computing. While
it remains to be formally proven that quantum computers are more powerful than their
classical counterparts (the so-called BQP 6= BPP conjecture), accumulating evidence seems
to support the intuition that many quantum phenomena cannot be efficiently simulated
with classical computing power, often incurring an exponential slowdown, as famously noted
by Richard Feynman as early as 1981 [6]. A more recent advance is the demonstration
that a class of phenomena containing the fractional quantum Hall effect is impervious to
quantum Monte Carlo simulations [7], which are classical algorithms, despite their name.
We shall thus proceed on the assumption that the current scientific consensus is correct and
that simulating the whole of our physics on classical resources would be infeasible. At the
other end of the spectrum, we shall suppose that our physics can be efficiently simulated
on quantum computing resources that we can theoretically envision. This is in fact not
necessarily true, for instance if there is no scale at which physics becomes discrete and the
information density of our world is infinite, or if gravity is truly beyond quantum mechanics
and requires an even more powerful computation paradigm. Keeping these assumptions in
mind, let us attempt to evaluate the proportion of beings potentially resulting from deliberate
simulations.
2 Estimating the proportion of simulated beings
The computing power theoretically attainable with the known laws of physics is immense.
Harnessing this power from a single kilogram of matter would allow for roughly 1050 OPS
(operations per second) [8], and furthermore these could be quantum operations on qubits.
Let us note this computing power density DMat = 1050 OPS/kg. By comparison, reason-
able estimates on the computing power of the human brain (whose average mass is
MBra ≈ 1.4 kg [9]) vary between 1014 and 1016 OPS [10, 11]. Here we use PBra = 1016 OPS.
In a hypothetical civilization with a technological level (which we note Civ) sufficient to use a
significant proportion of the computing power intrinsic to physical matter, say one-billionth,
it may thus be possible for a single computer the mass of a human brain to simulate the
real-time evolution of 1.4× 1025 virtual brains. We recognize that anthropocentric compar-
isons with the human brain are totally arbitrary on the cosmic scale, but exact numbers are
inconsequential for our purpose. Furthermore, as we are investigating the whole question
from a philosophical and futuristic point of view, we need not worry about the fact that our
own civilization is extremely far from being able to develop the technology we are discussing.
In a Civ -level civilization, each individual might reasonably be able to exploit such awe-
some computing power. Of course, the actual amount of available computing power will
vary immensely from civilization to civilization and from individual to individual. For our
treatment, it is sufficient that this amount be bounded, as a result of limitations stemming
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from either the dynamics of advanced civilizations or from the laws of physics themselves.1
Indeed, while an advanced individual might conceivably monopolize a whole planet and
transform it into a giant supercomputer, they could certainly not do the same with a whole
cluster of galaxies, if only because of the no-signalling principle. We note MUse the average
equivalent mass in maximally harnessed matter that each individual in Civ can use for their
computations, meaning that their computational power is given by MUseDMat . To cast this
in units of the number of brains they could simulate in real-time, we use the computational
power ratio
RCal =
MUseDMat
PBra
. (1)
(In order to help keep track of the many symbols used in this paper, a Table of Symbols is
provided in the Appendix.)
Over the history of a civilization and its ancestors, we note fCiv the fraction of individuals
having access to Civ -level computing power (individuals living before the development of
such technology, like ourselves, fall under 1− fCiv). We also note fDed the proportion of the
computing power available to people in fCiv dedicated to simulating virtual consciousnesses.
We may now use these (unknown) factors to obtain a very rough first estimate of NSim , the
number of sentient beings living in a simulated world
NSim = NRefCivfDedRCal , (2)
where NRe is the number of individuals living in the real world. We then obtain the fraction
of the total sentient population that is real as
fRe =
NRe
NRe +NSim
=
1
1 + fCivfDedRCal
(3)
and the fraction that is simulated as
fSim = 1− fRe = fCivfDedRCal
1 + fCivfDedRCal
. (4)
This may be generalized to the complete set of civilizations (each noted by the index j,
having total population NTot j, counting both real and simulated beings, and its own value
for each factor in equation (3)) over the life of the universe. The universal proportion of real
consciousnesses is then
fReU =
∑
j fRe jNTot j∑
j NTot j
. (5)
While our mathematical formulation in equation (4) is more general than that of refer-
ence [3], the basic idea, which we challenge here, remains the same. Recast in our scenario,
1On a universal scale, this will result in a certain proportionality between the total population and the
amount of computing power monopolized. All other parameters being the same, a universe twice as large as
another will on average have both twice its total population and twice its computing power.
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the original simulation argument says that, given that RCal is gigantic (even once we factor in
limited efficiency—see below—or lower the average amount of matterMUse that is effectively
leveraged per individual in Civ -level civilizations), one of the following statements must be
true:
1. The probability that we live in a simulation approaches unity, i.e. fSim ≈ 1, or
2. fCivfDed ≈ 0, i.e. at least one of fCiv or fDed is vanishingly small.
It is mathematically inescapable from equation (4) and the colossal scale ofRCal that fSim ≈ 1
unless fCivfDed ≈ 0 (as x/(1+x) approaches 1 when x becomes very large). Nevertheless, one
could reasonably challenge the claim made surreptitiously in statement (1) above. Indeed,
is the probability that we live in a simulation accurately represented by fSim? This claim
assumes implicitly that our world is typical, taking no account of possible extra evidence to
the contrary.In particular, it assumes that simulated intelligent beings are just as conscious
as real ones, which is certainly logical in the case where the necessary biological processes are
perfectly simulated, letting intelligence arise “naturally”, rather than having preprogrammed
artificial intelligence, no matter how complex. More importantly, it supposes that the quality
and persistence of our world and the lack of inconsistencies in its behaviour can be disregarded
as evidence that it is real.In fact, fSim is only a baseline probability that needs to be adjusted
according to Bayes’ inference rules in the light of other factors, which are virtually impossible
to evaluate. Nevertheless, we concede that RCal is sufficiently large for this caveat not
to invalidate Bostrom’s simulation argument [3]. Instead, the main thrust of the rest of
this section is to challenge equation (4) itself, and therefore the ominous inevitability of
fCivfDed ≈ 0 whenever fSim is not close to unity.
But first, let us pretend we accept equation (4) and explore the possibility that fCivfDed
indeed approaches 0. If fDed ≈ 0, it simply means that advanced civilizations do not use a
significant portion of their computing power to simulate worlds like ours. This could happen
for a large variety of reasons, from a simple lack of interest to a social taboo. A society
of beings similar to us (but with a much greater technological development) could indeed
decide it is not very ethical to simulate beings with enough precision to make them conscious
while fooling them and keeping them cut-off from the real world. On the other hand, we
can imagine many motivations that would lead them to create such simulated worlds and
beings: sociological research, strategic planning, and maybe even an advanced form of exotic
tourism. Indeed, someone with enough resources to simulate a world and its beings could also
possess the technology necessary to project themselves into the simulation in order to explore
different planets, eras, and realities. Even if laws or taboos seek to prevent the simulation
of complete consciousnesses, infrequent infractions would be sufficient to increase fDed , and
therefore fSim (unless fCiv ≈ 0, which we explore in the next paragraph), to a non-negligible
figure.
If instead fCiv ≈ 0, the conclusion might be considerably more worrisome. It would
suggest that societies of intelligent beings are unable to reach the Civ level. It is indeed pos-
sible that it is technologically much easier to create weapons capable of eradicating entire
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civilizations in the real world than to obtain the computing power needed to simulate them
in a virtual world. This is probably what Musk meant when he said at the Code Confer-
ence 2016: “Either we’re going to create simulations that are indistinguishable from reality,
or civilization will cease to exist. Those are the two options.” [5] Even if civilizations be-
come more mature and peaceful as they evolve, as scientific advances multiply not only the
computational but also the destructive capabilities of individuals, isolated instances of mur-
derous insanity might be sufficient to lead societies to extinction. The dramatic and mostly
unexpected increase in both types of power the human species has achieved since World
War II has probably brought us closer to self-eradication than to world simulation, but how
it plays out in the future remains to be seen. Furthermore, we can only speculate about
other civilizations and species.
Does equation (4) condemn us to a pessimistic vision of the world where we are either
prisoner of someone else’s simulation (and thus at their mercy), or on a path toward assured
self-destruction? As the equation is considerably too simple to account for all important
factors, not necessarily. For instance, it is not sufficient to be able to simulate a large amount
of virtual brains in order to obtain a credible simulation of a world resembling ours: the
environment must also be adequately simulated. Reference [3] discounts the computational
cost of simulating the environment based on the fact that the human sensory bandwidth is
on the order of 108 bits per second and that physics can be bought down to a minimum
degree of complexity in a simulation. However, 108 bits per second per person is merely
the size of the input to the human senses and does not account for the complexity of the
computation required to obtain the correct bits that will consistently fool all the simulated
consciousnesses (not only into thinking they are “real”, but also into thinking the known laws
of physics are properly respected, for instance when they observe the fractional quantum Hall
effect [12]). Saying that this is computationally easy because the human senses have limited
bandwidth is akin to saying solving chess is easy because there are only 3 possible outputs
(white wins, black wins, or draw).
To account for and investigate the cost of simulating the environment, we introduce the
factor CEnv into equation (3), and thus implicitly also into equation (4). We define CEnv as the
average ratio of the computing power necessary to simulate the environment of an individual
to that necessary to simulate its consciousness. As no computation is 100% efficient, we also
introduce fEff to represent the reciprocal of the number of physical operations required in
base reality to perform one logical operation in the simulation. Thus, the number of simulated
individuals NSim and the proportion of real beings fRe , previously given by equations (2)
and (3), must be amended as follows:
NSim =
NRefCivfDedRCalfEff
1 + CEnv
(6)
fRe =
NRe
NRe +NSim
=
1
1 +
fCivfDedRCalfEff
1+CEnv
. (7)
We see that fRe increases compared to equation (3). Let us look at different scenarios to see
just how much, depending on the environment’s simulated physics.
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Physics could of course be completely different inside and outside the simulation. The
required level of complexity needed in the laws of physics of the simulation depends very
much on its purpose. If the interest is simply to create worlds where many intelligent beings
live and interact, it would be advantageous to choose laws of physics that allow for intelligence
but minimize the cost of simulating the environment. This would be the case for simulated
worlds designed for tourism, gaming, and general escapism. However, by their very nature,
these are unlikely to require quantum physics and, as we are investigating these scenarios
to evaluate the probability that our own world is a simulation, we note that if our physics
had been chosen to minimize the required computing power while providing an entertaining
environment, we almost certainly would not find such a high ratio of MBraDMat to PBra .
On the other hand, for more “serious” purposes, civilizations are likely to be more interested
in simulating societies that resemble them and evolve in similar environments, as lessons
learned from the simulations would be much easier to apply to the real world. Indeed, when
a civilization has the Civ level of technology, a large part of its dynamics must be strongly
dependent on science and technology and a simulation of a world with different laws of
physics and technological possibilities is likely to quickly diverge from it.
At the other end of the spectrum, if the laws of physics are similar inside and outside the
simulation, it would be extremely costly to have the environment simulated down to its most
microscopic level. Indeed, interactions leading to consciousness inside our brains represent
only a minuscule fraction of all individual interactions taking place in the environment,
leading to a CEnv so large that even the scale of RCal cannot compensate for it and allow
the simulation of a large number of intelligent beings.
In order to be both tractable and representative of the real world, a simulation should
have a variable level of complexity, cutting corners while no intelligent being is paying close
attention, but able to recreate the full complexity of physics when necessary. In this type
of scenario, we would be forcing our simulators to temporarily use more computing power
to simulate our environment when we conduct experiments that enable us to understand
(or exploit) physics at its microscopic level. On the flip side, when we are being inattentive to
physics on that scale, the computing power required to simulate our environment could indeed
be much smaller. A simulated universe with a variable level of complexity could provide an
explanation to Fermi’s paradox 2. Indeed, while advanced intelligent civilizations could build
self-replicating probes that enable a relatively fast search of a galaxy (over perhaps a few
million years even if superluminal travel is impossible), we shall never encounter such probes
if we live in a simulation in which the default physics is too simplified for life to arise far
away from the (simulated) Earth. Actually, the fact that we have not detected any evidence
for the existence of extraterrestrial civilizations may be considered as the most convincing
argument in favour of the theory according to which we live in a simulation, quite unlike
other arguments introduced in this paper, which run in the opposite direction.
2 The fact that we detect no evidence for the existence of extraterrestrial civilizations despite the great
number of star systems in which they could potentially arise [13, 14].
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Now that we’ve argued that a simulation with variable complexity is most advantageous
(and therefore most likely) from the simulators’ point of view, we turn to the possibility of a
recursive scenario. Considering that the simulated world should be similar to the real one to
maximize its utility, civilizations within it are likely to start creating their own simulations
once they have reached Civ . If the initial simulation features physics with a complexity
that varies depending on how the simulated beings use or observe it, it will slow down con-
siderably when they start using a large amount of computing power in order to run their
own simulations. This should remain undetectable from inside the simulation, as it is only
possible to compare the relative speeds of phenomena within one’s self or environment, and
a uniform slowdown compared to an external reference has no impact on the simulated
denizens. However, from the point of view of the (real) simulators, their simulation will
gradually slow down unless it is allotted more and more computing power. This will hap-
pen even more dramatically if the simulated civilization uses a large amount of computing
power for various purposes, in addition to running their own simulations. As unavoidable
consequence of the simulated beings’ computations, a significant increase in CEnv will take
place in equation (7).
To estimate this increase, recall that a proportion fCiv of the simulated population will
have reached a technological level sufficient to harness a computing power equivalent to
MUseDMat per individual. If all this available power is actually used, each of these simulated
individuals will incur an environmental simulation cost equivalent toMUseDMat/PBra = RCal
(by equation (1)) times the cost of the simulation of their own existence (in addition to the
computational cost of the rest of their environment). This environmental overhead ratio is
precisely what we called CEnv . It follows that
CEnv ≥ fCivRCal (8)
in a scenario according to which the simulated beings use all their available computing power
once they have reached technological level Civ . But even if not all the available computing
power is used by these denizens, at least an fDed fraction of it must be spent by definition
for the simulated civilizations’ own simulations. We may therefore prefer to use the more
conservative (but inescapable) bound
CEnv ≥ fCivfDedRCal . (9)
If the first simulated level can create its own simulations, the same goes for the second level,
the third, and so on. This gives us a scenario in which the simulations are nested within one
another (see Figure 1) and where, of course, the computing power available on a given level
must be strictly less than that in the one above it (in the sense of closer to reality). To obtain
a mathematical model of this scenario, let Ni denote the “real” population of level i (unlike
NTot j in equation (5)), so that N0 denotes the real (no quotes) population in base reality,
which we called NRe previously. We adapt equation (6) to the recursive context by replacing
NRe and NSim by Ni and Ni+1, respectively, which yields the recurrence equation
NifCivfDedRCalfEff = Ni+1(1 + CEnv) . (10)
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Figure 1: Hierarchy of simulations nested within one another. The system on which the
level i + 1 simulation is computed is on level i. The total computing power used
to simulate a level must therefore gradually decrease as we get further and further
from base reality (level 0). Note that while we show only one simulation per level,
in all likelihood there would be many running in parallel.
The parameters in this equation could of course vary between the levels, but we can use
average parameters to investigate what happens when all levels are similar. Equation (10)
enables us to find the average population ratio between consecutive levels, which we call fPop
for simplicity:
fPop =
Ni+1
Ni
=
fCivfDedRCalfEff
1 + CEnv
. (11)
It follows immediately that the estimated population Ni at level i > 0 is
Ni = (fPop)
iN0 , (12)
which leads to a geometric series for the total population of a system of maximum simulation
depth I:
NTot =
I∑
i=0
Ni = N0
I∑
i=0
(fPop)
i . (13)
As the number of levels is large but finite 3, the infinite geometric series gives us a bound on
the sum, which allows us to obtain a new version of equation (7):
fRe =
N0
NTot
=
1∑I
i=0 (fPop)
i
>
1∑∞
i=0 (fPop)
i = 1− fPop . (14)
3Note that even in an infinite universe with infinite real and simulated populations, the number of levels
must remain finite. Indeed, each level must be a collection of finite simulations, which would be infinite in
number in an infinite universe, each involving a finite quantity of energy and computing power. The strictly
decreasing available computing power at each further level means that at some point the available power
for each individual simulation falls below the minimum required amount to support a complex civilization.
Furthermore, note that in order to regularize our treatment in the case of a universe infinite in space, time,
or even number of branches, the factors must be evaluated and averaged out over a finite region that is
sufficiently large in all dimensions and parameters to be representative.
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The total fraction of simulated beings is therefore
fSim = 1− fRe < fPop . (15)
Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to estimate the values of the factors appearing in
equation (11), which defines fPop .In a way, the situation is analogous to that of Drake’s
equation [15], which contains too many hard-to-estimate factors to really enable us to calcu-
late the number of extraterrestrial civilizations in the galaxy. We can nonetheless conclude
from equations (9) and (11) that
fPop <
fCivfDedRCalfEff
CEnv
≤ fCivfDedRCalfEff
fCivfDedRCal
= fEff (16)
and it follows from equation (15) that fSim also is upper-bounded by fEff , which is most likely
under 50%. Indeed, even for an advanced civilization, a quantum computation that requires
no more than two physical operations per logical one would be quite an achievement! If we
accept equation (8), which holds assuming that the simulated beings use all their available
computing power once they have reached technological level Civ , the same reasoning allows us
to lower our upper bound on fSim to fDedfEff , for which there is little possible doubt it would
fall below 50%. The same conclusion holds (with no need to assume anything about fEff )
even if we do not accept equation (8), under the hard-to-contradict assumption that the
simulated civilization will not spend more computing power on simulations than on the sum
total of all their other computations. The recursive scenario thus gives us a reasonable
situation in which there are more real than simulated consciousnesses despite the gigantic
value of RCal . It is interesting to notice that we are able to reach this conclusion by assuming
recursively that simulated civilizations will start creating their own simulations once they
have reached Civ , whereas we would not be able to do so on the basis of equation (6) alone.
This is somewhat counterintuitive since one might be tempted to think that the recursive
creation of simulations can only increase the number of simulated beings!
Equation (12) predicts an ever-decreasing probability of existing at a specific level i of the
simulation hierarchy as i increases. This is a fairly direct consequence of the fact that the
total computing power must decrease with each successive level and that the complexity of
the simulated beings or laws of physics cannot keep decreasing.In a sense, this is reassuring, as
the deeper one exists in the hierarchy, the higher the probability of the simulation suffering
an apocalyptic failure or shutdown becomes. Indeed, if any of the levels experiences a
cataclysm, a war, a social reorganization, or simply a loss of interest, it could mean the
end of all simulations under it. The long-term persistence of our world (assuming it is not
an illusion) is therefore at least evidence that lowers the likelihood that it is a simulation
existing very deep in this hierarchy.
Note that it is not necessarily true that at any given time the population of level i+ 1 is
smaller than that of level i. The more limited computing power for level i+1 could support
a greater amount of consciousnesses if time elapses at a slower rate than on the level above.
This still results in a smaller total population for level i+1 once integrated over a sufficiently
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long reference time external to the simulations. In this scenario, the probability that the
simulation suffers catastrophic failure during the lifetime of an individual increases even faster
as a function of i. Indeed, the compounded effect of the slowdown factors multiplied together
makes it so that during a simulated being’s lifespan, entire civilizations could rise and fall
on levels much closer to reality, greatly lowering the chance of uninterrupted simulation.
Fortunately for the security of simulated beings, a simulation that is too slow with respect
to the level that computes it is certainly much less useful and it is likely that most advanced
civilizations will instead choose to simulate fewer consciousnesses, but at a faster rate.
3 Surveillance from Above
If our universe happens to be a deliberate simulation, we might have to worry about being
observed by beings who live on the levels closer to reality. As mentioned in Section 2, we
can also worry that they will stop simulating us, intentionally or not, but there is not much
we can do about that, except maybe let them observe us and strive to remain entertaining.
If the simulation is flawless and runs on classical computing power, it is fairly obvious
that no defence is possible against external observation. Indeed, if that is the case quantum
phenomena in our universe are also simulated by classical operations. All information can
therefore be copied at will by the simulators without affecting the simulation, and thus
without possibility of detection.In fact, this is exactly what we do when we play a video
game or perform most of our physics simulations. In addition to not being able to rely on
quantum effects, we would also not even be protected by the constraint of no-signalling,
as the distance between two points may be completely different in the simulating system
and the evolution of the simulation could be paused to allow for interaction between distant
components of the system.
For once, it is to our advantage that perfection is so difficult to achieve. If the simulation
is classical but imperfect, we might be able to figure it out. As is often seen in video games,
computing errors can have a pretty flagrant impact on a simulated world. To illustrate
this impact, we can look at collision detection errors, still very frequent despite the growing
realism of modern games. When two objects that should collide pass through one another,
the resulting “clipping” can break the player’s immersion. The inverse error, where an object’s
path is blocked even in the absence of an obstacle can be even more problematic, potentially
stopping the game’s progression. From inside a simulation, such errors leading to incoherent
laws of physics might be detected, hinting at the world’s artificiality.
Even if the laws of physics are perfectly programmed in the simulation, any real system is
imperfect and can be affected by its environment. A good example is radiation flipping bits
in a computer’s physical memory. This type of error could affect certain simulated physical
processes if the deployed error correction schemes are insufficient. Furthermore, if these
errors are sufficiently frequent and affect the simulating system in a non-uniform manner
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(for instance part of the system could be more exposed to the radiation source), it may even
be possible to obtain information on the simulating level from inside the simulation.
If quantum phenomena are as difficult to compute on classical systems as we believe them
to be, a simulation containing our world would most probably run on quantum computing
power. Unless the simulators are infinitely patient, the slowdown required to simulate quan-
tum effects on classical systems would be prohibitive for all but the simplest simulations. Can
we then rely on restrictions imposed by quantum mechanics to limit the possible surveillance
from above? In a way, we can. To start with, the simulators cannot measure too large a quan-
tity of quantum information without destroying the simulation. The structure of materials
depends on quantum superposition in the electrons’ state space. A measure (even coming
from outside the universe) capable of precisely determining their position would (according
to the uncertainty principle σxjσpj ≥ ~2) give them enough momentum to destroy any object
they constitute. It is thus impossible for the simulators to be completely omniscient about
their simulation. Instead of measuring all the quantum information, they could select a small
proportion of the qubits to measure. If this sampling is done in a random manner, this could
potentially be detected from within the simulation. Indeed, randomly measuring part of the
quantum information would induce errors in the simulation’s quantum correlations, which
we could eventually detect with sufficiently precise experiments.
If Alice and Bob are (unbeknownst to them) simulated beings testing a quantum key
establishment protocol [16] and they discover noise on their quantum channel, they should
(as cryptographers) suppose it is caused by eavesdropping on the channel. If the noise cannot
be explained by the equipment used and they discover no spies with access to their channel,
they should (as scientists) start asking questions. If Alice, Bob and their colleagues discover
that this noise is omnipresent when the precision of the equipment is sufficient to reveal it,
despite all attempts to isolate the experiment from the environment, they should conclude
that either they have misunderstood the laws of physics in their universe (as in the historical
case of Penzias and Wilson detecting the cosmic microwave background as noise on their
antenna [17]), or that they are being targeted by surveillance from outside their universe. . .
The simulators’ abilities could however extend much beyond random and generalized
surveillance. They could concentrate their surveillance on macroscopic and therefore “clas-
sical” information that exists within the quantum simulation. Unfortunately, almost all the
information that concerns us falls within this category. As far as we can determine, human
consciousness only treats information classically. Indeed, while some researchers claim that
the human brain behaves like a quantum computer (see for instance reference [18]), no actual
scientific evidence supports this. We are fairly certain our brains function by classical com-
putation and we present several arguments to this effect.
To start with, while biological systems are certainly quantum at a microscopic scale and
quantum effects contribute to some aspects of brain chemistry, the time scales involved in
human thought are more than large enough to make coherence nearly impossible to main-
tain (especially at the temperature of the human body). Indeed, reference [19] computes a
coherence time varying between 10−20 and 10−13 s, while the fastest dynamical effects within
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our neurons take more than 10−7 s. The interactions between neurons are slower than this by
several orders of magnitude (generally below 10−3 s), so it is extremely unlikely that quantum
computation can function based on those, even within a restricted region of the brain.
Beyond the purely physical arguments against quantum computation happening on a large
scale in our brains, there are also problems pertaining to its biological evolution. Notably,
it is unlikely that quantum computational capabilities would contribute to an organism’s
evolutionary fitness. While the human eye might well be able to detect single photons [20],
nearly all the information we can access through our senses is classical, and all the effects
we can have on our environment are also classical. Of course, this is no longer strictly
true now that we can perform quantum mechanics experiments, but this is hardly relevant
to our evolutionary history. So, as the brain’s inputs and outputs are classical, the only
fitness advantage that could arise from quantum computing power is an algorithmic speedup
in the treatment of classical information. However, it is fairly obvious that the brain is
extremely inefficient at solving problems that have been shown to benefit from a quantum
speedup (factorization, discrete logarithm extraction, black box function inversion, etc.).
If the ability to quickly solve such problems mattered in terms of evolutionary fitness, our
brains would be much better optimized for them, with or without quantum capabilities.
It is true that many more tasks that benefit from quantum computation have yet to be
discovered, but the same reasoning is likely to apply to those as well.
Even if we assume that the addition of quantum computing capabilities to our brain would
enhance our evolutionary fitness, another significant problem remains: in order for a trait
to arise from natural selection, it cannot be arbitrarily far from pre-existing configurations
in genetic phase space. It is for that reason that certain useful structures easily devised
by intelligent beings (macroscopic wheel and axle systems for locomotion [21], for example)
cannot be found in the animal kingdom. A complex structure can develop gradually if
the steps leading to it already confer a fitness advantage. In this way, membranes that
enable gliding can eventually evolve into more complex wings, or regions of photoreceptor
cells can lead to the formation of eyes. However, it is extremely likely that a cerebral
structure enabling quantum computation would be very far (from the state occupied by
our distant ancestors) in the genetic configuration space, potentially requiring completely
different materials from those usually synthesized by living cells. So, unless we can show
that intermediate configurations leading to such a structure could by themselves confer a
fitness advantage, we can conclude it is nearly impossible for it to have arisen from natural
selection.
For the reasons we have presented, the information necessary to describe a human being’s
thoughts must be essentially classical and very redundant. The external actions we take
generally produce consequences on an even larger scale. Our potential simulators could
therefore, if they are sufficiently astute, measure only an infinitesimal portion of the simula-
tion’s total information while still allowing the reconstruction of our thoughts and actions.
In this way, they could identify our precise quantum experiments and avoid creating detect-
able perturbations on the involved systems. The classical, macroscopic scale on which we
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live and think thus makes us fundamentally vulnerable. This is no surprise, as almost all
practical eavesdropping attacks (notable exceptions include attacks that exploit weaknesses
in poorly implemented quantum cryptographic schemes [22, etc.]) use in some form or other
the redundancy of classical information to copy it without perturbing it in a detectable way.
Since our potential simulators could measure (the classical information in) our brain-
states, it would be quite difficult to hide information from them. We could envision using the
outcome of measurements of quantum systems in order to surprise them (knowing we would
ourselves not be able to anticipate the result). We could try to create our own simulated
worlds, different in that they would run on a form of encrypted quantum computation to
make sure they cannot be spied upon by levels closer to base reality (including our own).
If, as discussed in Section 2, we develop the technological means to project ourselves into
the worlds we simulate, we could thus hope to escape the control of our own simulators
(apart from their continued ability to end our existence at will by resetting their computing
system).
Unfortunately, there is a very general attack that can counter attempts at putting in-
formation out of the simulators’ reach. As they have physical possession of the systems
where all the information is actually encoded and processed, the simulators can (after paus-
ing the evolution of the simulation, if necessary) take part of the information and process
it differently from the rest of the simulation.4 If we model their quantum computer with
box and wire diagrams as in Figure 2, this corresponds to taking the appropriate wires and
connecting them to new boxes implementing a circuit of their choice. At the same time, the
simulators can feed different information into the simulation’s original boxes (in a way that
can depend on the result of the application of the new circuit to the original information).
This attack allows the simulators to completely bypass all quantum cryptographic systems
we could wish to use, simply by feeding the input into a circuit that does not implement
the cryptographic solution. The ability to dynamically change the wiring of the simulation
therefore constitutes a potentially insurmountable advantage.
In the scenario where we attempt to transfer ourselves into our own simulated worlds, our
simulators could intercept the information on which our consciousnesses are encoded and
modify or project it into a different environment. We could thus find ourselves in a new
simulation under their control, while thinking ourselves securely in the encrypted system we
have developed. If the simulators are particularly angry at our attempted escape, they could
also send us to a simulated hell, in which case we would at least have the confirmation we
were truly living inside a simulation and our paranoia was not unjustified. . .
4Note that in recursive scenarios, higher level simulators would also be able to acquire extensive infor-
mation about various levels embedded in theirs. They could thus mitigate part of the recursive efficiency
loss by intercepting and running themselves the computations (including simulations of further levels) taking
place on lower levels, leading to a higher effective average fEff . As it would still be bounded below 1, this
higher average efficiency does not compromise our treatment of the recursion.
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Figure 2: A simulated scientist, Alice, attempts to use an encrypted quantum computation
system to protect some information (potentially including the thoughts of simu-
lated beings) from external surveillance. Unfortunately, the simulator can thwart
that attempt by redirecting the quantum information into a circuit of his choice.
Indeed, he can temporarily interrupt the evolution of the simulation, take the ap-
propriate wires in his quantum computer, and connect them to a different circuit
(that does not implement Alice’s cryptographic protocols). He can use this strategy
to substitute not only his own circuits for Alice’s, but also his keys and data for
Alice’s.
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A Table of Symbols
OPS Operations per second
DMat Maximum computing power density of matter, roughly 1050 OPS/kg
MBra Average mass of a human brain, roughly 1.4 kg
PBra Typical computing power of a human brain, roughly 1016 OPS
Civ Technological level necessary to exploit a “sizable” fraction of DMat
MUse Average equivalent mass in maximally harnessed matter usable by an individual in Civ
RCal Average number of virtual brains that can be simulated by an individual in Civ
fCiv Fraction of individuals having access to Civ over the history of a civilization
fDed Fraction of available computing power in Civ dedicated to simulating consciousnesses
NRe Number of real individuals over the history of a civilization
NSim Number of simulated individuals over the history of a civilization
fRe Fraction of real individuals over the history of a civilization
fSim Fraction of simulated individuals over the history of a civilization
CEnv Proportional computational cost of simulating an individual’s environment
fEff Computational efficiency of a simulation
Ni Population native to level i in a recursive chain of simulations
fPop Average population ratio Ni+1/Ni between consecutive simulation levels
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